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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE ST A T'E O·F UTAH
BARRETT INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

Pla.in.tiff,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9872

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defen.da(Jfl;t.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a. decision of the State Tax
Commission. The question present is whether or not the
plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company, is liable for a
Utah use tax on out-of-state purchases of airplane parts
and parts for a ski lift.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION
After consideration of the facts and the law, the Tax
Commission cancelled part and sustained part of the
deficiency assessment against Barrett Investment Company, in a decision dated February 18, 1963.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of that part of the Commission's decision which sustained the deficiency
assessment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company (hereinafter
referred to as ''Barrett''), made a series of purchases
during the period from June 1, 1958, to July 31, 1961,
which may be categorized as follows (R. 45) :
Category (a) : Purchases from Dallas Aero Service
of airplane parts in the amount of $8,816.05.
Category (b) : Purchases of parts for a ski lift
from various out-of-state firms in the total amount of
$50,163.70.
Category (c): Purchase of a motor apparatus for
ski lift from Graybar Electric Company in the amount
of $42,812.00.
Under date of August 2, 1962, the Auditing Division
of the State Tax Commission prepared and issued a
deficiency assessment against Barrett Investment Company in the amount of $2,747.35 (R. 26-37). This was
based on the transactions listed above and included interest to July 30, 1962; $2,443.01 was listed as due and
owing to the State Tax Commission, the remainder to
Salt Lake County under terms of the Utah local option
use tax provided for in Title 11, Chapter 9, U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff took objection to this assessment and filed a
timely petition for redetermination of the same (R. 2-3).
2
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This objection was based upon four grounds, two of which
are not asserted by Barrett in this appeal. The third was
accepted by the Commission in its decision. The objection still advanced read as follows :
'' 1. That the purchases of the petitioner upon
which a use tax is sought to be imposed
are exempt from the use tax by reason of the
provisions of 59-16-4, U.C.A. 1953. That the
said purchases were of property, the gross
receipts from the use of which are now subject
to a sales tax under the laws of the State of
Utah.''
This is a claim of exemption under 59-16-4( d).
In addition, Barrett urges that he is entitled to
exemption under provision of 59-16-4(h). This contention was not made before the Commission and is being
here advanced for the first time.
A hearing was held, at which Attorney Lee W. Hobbs
presented the plaintiff's objections to the assessment.
The Commission, in its decision (R. 45-47), upheld the
deficiency assessment on the purchases in Category (a)
and Category (b). Barrett's position as to the purchase
in Category (c) was sustained, however, and that portion
of the deficiency assessment ($856.25) based upon this
purchase was dismissed.
Plaintiff has never seriously contended that the tax
is inappropriate as far as it applies to the transactions
in Category (a), the purchase of airplane parts from
Dallas Aero Service (R. 8-9). The items here involved
were not made part of the ski lift (R. 7-8). The brief of
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plaintiff attacks the position of the Commission only on
those items in Category (b). The argument in this
brief will deal only with these purchases.
The essential facts are not in dispute. The parties
have stipulated that the items in Category (b) are component parts of a ski lift at Brighton, Utah; that sales
tax has been collected and remitted on admissions paid
to ride the ski lift; and that neither a sales nor a use tax
has been paid on any of the purchases here involved
(R. 6-7). Findings of fact Nos. 3 and 4 in the Commission's decision (R. 45) are based upon this stipulation. The Court's attention is directed to a typographical error in finding 3 in the Record. The finding begins :
''That the Barrett Investment Company constructed a ski lift out of parts purchased heretofore described in 1 (a) and (b), ... ''
This should read :
That the Barrett Investment Company constructed a ski lift out of parts purchased heretofore described in 1 (b) and (c).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRANSACTIONS HERE INVOLVED
ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AND SUBJECT TO THE TAX UNDER THE UTAH USE
TAX ACT.
4
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The deficiency assessment in this case was made
under provision of Title 59, Chapter 16, Sec. 3, U.C.A.
1953, which provides as follows :
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the
storage, use or other consumption in this state of
tangible personal property purchased for storage,
use or other consumption in this state at the rate
of 21;2% * of the sales price of such property.
''Every person storing, using or otherwise consuming in this state tangible personal property
purchased shall be liable for the tax imposed by
this act, and the liability shall not be extinguished
until the tax has been paid to this state.''
The Utah use tax is complementary to the sales tax,
and broadens the excise tax base and makes the imposition of the sales tax more equitable. Union Portland Cement v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d
164, modified 110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879.
The typical situation for the imposition of this tax
is the situation in the instant case - property is purchased out of state and brought into the state for use,
storage or other consumption.
Since the transactions meet the test of Section
59-16-3, plaintiff is subject to the tax unless specifically
exempted. Exemption is claimed under two subsections
of 59-16-4, and Barrett's contentions will be dealt with
in points 2 and 3 of this brief.
*Since the transactions here involved, the rate has been changed
to 3 per cent on a state-wide basis. However, the 2% per cent
was in force during the period in which the disputed purchases
were made. There is in addition a % per cent local option use
tax involved.
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On pages 4 and 5 of plaintiff's brief, the correct rule
of tax exemption construction is stated. Exemption statutes are to be construed strictly against those seeking
exemption, and the burden is on them to establish an affirmative case in favor of exemption. This rule has been
articulated by a leading authority as follows:
''As a general rule, grants of tax exemptions are
given a rigid interpretation against the assertions
of the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power.
The basis for the rule here is the same as that supporting a rule of strict construction of positive
revenue laws -that the burden of taxation should
be distributed equally and fairly among the members of society.'' Sutherland, Statutory Construction,. Vol. 3, Sec. 6702.
The respected and venerable tax law treatise,
Cooley on Taxa.tion, states the same principle in this
manner:
"An intention on the part of the legislature to
grant an exemption from the taxing power of the
state will never be implied from language which
will admit of any other reasonable construction.
Such an intention must be expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms or must appear by necessary
implication from the language used, for it is a
well-settled principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is claimed under a state, charter
or act of ill-corporation, it is to be construed
strictly against the property owner and in favor
of the public. This principle applies with peculiar
force to a claim of exemption fom taxation. Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on a
claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption, and an alleged grant of exemption will be
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

strictly construed and cannot he made out by inference or implication but must be beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is
the rule, and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed
in clear and unambiguous terms ; it cannot be
taken to have been intended when the language
of the statute on which it depends is doubtful or
uncertain; and the burden of establishing it is
upon him who claims it. Moreover, if an exemption is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by
construction, since the reasonable presumption is
that the state has granted in express terms all it
intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the
favor would be extended beyond what was
meant. . . . '' Vol. 2, Sec. 672.
We are fortunate in our jurisdiction to have two of
the leading cases standing for this proposition of la,v,
which is accepted in virtually every American jurisdiction. The first, Judge v. Spencer, dealing with property
tax, was decided in 1897. The Court said :
'' ... the court will not aid or enlarge exemptions
by interpretation. The presumption is that all
exemptions intended to be granted were granted
in express terms. In such cases the rule of strict
construction applies, and, in order to relieve any
species of property from its due and just proportion of the burdens of the government, the language relied on, as creating the exemption, should
be so clear as not to admit of reasonable controversy about its meaning, for all doubts must be resolved against the exemption. The power to tax
rests upon necessity, and is essential to the state.''
15 Utah 242, 249; 48 Pac. 1097, 1099-1100.
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The second is the case of Stillman v. Lynch ( 1920),
56 Utah 540, 547; 192 Pac. 272, 275; 12 A.L.H. 552, 556.
The Court held as follows :
"If as to exemption there is doubt, that doubt will
be resolved in favor of taxation. It has been said
taxation is the rule, exemption the exception. ''
This proposition was stated with particular cogency
by the United States Supreme Court in Farrin.gton v.
Tennessee, 94 U.S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558, 560:
"When exemption is claimed, it must be shown
indubitably to exist. At the outset every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal to
the claim. It is only when the claims of the concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any other
construction that the proposition can be supported."
The equity and necessity behind this principle are
familiar enough that they need not be belabored in any
detail. Every exemption that excuses a person or an
article of property or transaction from taxation throws
a correspondingly greater burden on all other persons or
articles of property or transactions actually taxed.
Therefore, exemptions must, in the interest of fairness,
be granted in only those situations where the legislature
has determined that they are merited and specifically
·expressed this determination, and in no others. Defendant contends that the plaintiff in the instant case does not
merit such an exemption, and will examine this contention in the remainder of this brief.
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POINT II.
THE PURCHASES HERE INVOLVED ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM
UTAH USE TAX UNDER PROVISION OF
SECTION 59-16-4(d), U.O.A. 1953.
Use tax exemptions in this country fall into several
rather easily definable classifications. One type exempts
from taxation transactions involving certain categories of
property. Another provides that certain persons or
organizations be exempt from the tax, without regard to
the inherent nature of the property involved. Still another negates the tax on certain transactions because of
certain characteristics of the transactions themselves,
such as the fact that interstate commerce may be involved.
The fourth category excuses imposition of the tax because
the property involved in the transaction has been, or is
about to he- either in its present or a modified formsubjected to a sales or use tax as a part of the same
transaction or series of transactions.
Both of the exemption provisions under which Barrett claims exemption in the instant case are of the lastnamed type. The first relied upon, 59-16-4( d), provided,
during the period in question, exemption for:
"Property, the gross receipts from the sale, distribution or use of which are now subject to a sale
or excise tax under the laws of this state or of
some other state of the United States.''
This Court has interpreted this section as follows:
''The clear intent of the legislature in passing subsection (d) was to prevent duplication of taxes and
9
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discrimination against property which was
already subject to a tax comparable to the US('
tax." Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 110 Utah 145,.170 Pac. 2d 169.
Almost all states in which the use tax is in force have
statutory provision for a similar exemption. The wording
of the statutes vary considerably, but all create what is
in substance the same exemption. If a sales or use tax
has been paid, or is about to be paid, on the transaction
in question or gross receipts from the sale, distribution
or use of the property as part of this transaction or a
closely related series of transactions, a use tax will
not lie.
The State Tax Commission has interpreted this subsection in a manner consistent with the Portland Cement
holding. This interpretation is entitled to great weight
in connection with those laws which it has the responsibility to administer. Indeed, the Commission's interpretation is presumably correct, and the Commission's ruling should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, or
unless an abuse of the administrative discretion is present. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction., Vol. 2, Sees.
5103 and 5105; see also Western Leather & Finding Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526.
The reference in the Union Portla.nd Cement case to
"duplication of taxes" is revealing. The real intent of
the legislature in enacting subsection (d) was the prevention of duplicate taxation or of double taxation. Perhaps this section would create exemption beyond the
10
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actual double taxation prohibition, but this is nonetheless the legislative motive in enacting the provision.
The constitutional and equitable provision against
double taxation is a prohibition against multiple taxation of the same type on the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, two sales taxes or a sales and use tax could
not be imposed on the same purchase. But this does not
mean the same property cannot be subjected to a series
of taxes throughout its life. For instance, a person may
purchase a valuable painting and pay a sales tax thereon.
He may pay an ad valorem tax on it each year he owns it
until his death, when it may he subjected to an inheritance
tax. The heir may then sell it to a third party and another
sales tax is imposed and the process starts all over again.
This is only one example of many that could he given.
Defendant submits that in this frame of reference it
is clear that this prohibition is not being violated by the
imposition of a use tax against Barrett. The purchase of
ski lift parts and the taxing of admissions to the ski lift
are not duplicate taxes upon one transaction or a series
of transactions closely enough related to make taxation on both prohibitive.
The question before this Court, as far as plaintiff
is concerned, is not whether he be required to pay one
tax or two taxes, but whether he is to pay one tax or
no tax. The tax on admissions is paid by the skiers
using the lift; Barrett's only function in relation thereto
is as a collector and remitter. Barrett is the ultimate
consumer of these parts, and it is not inequitable or
11
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discriminatory to require his paying an excise tax on the
purchase thereof.
The construction of this statute urged upon this
Court by plaintiff, reduced to its barest essentials, is
that the transfer of any property, on which an exeisl'
tax would normally be appropriate, would not be subject
to such excise tax if such property is used after purchase
in any manner whatsoever that would bring any monies
("gross receipts") to the user upon which an excise ta:s:
1s paid.
An acceptance of this construction would have farreaching consequences. A few examples will clarify this
contention. Any theater purchasing chairs or projection
equipment would not have to pay a sales or use tax on
this equipment because the ''gross receipts'' of the use
thereof, admission tickets, would be subject to a sales
tax. Plates and silverware used in a restaurant would
also he exempt, as would any equipment used in manufacturing or constructing any commodity on which a sales
or use tax is appropriate. In an office, paper, pencils,
ballpoint pens or similar items would be exempt if the
company involved was manufacturing any product or performing any service upon which an excise tax is paid.
It could even be argued that any food consumed by a person producing a taxable product or service to the public
would be exempt from this tax, since the food would
create energy, and the "gross receipt" from the "use"
of this food as energy could contribute to the service or
the commodity which he sells. This last illustration
might be considered reductio ad absurdum, hut defendant
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submits that it follows logically and inevitably from
plaintiff's interpretation of this section.
An adoption of Barrett's interpretation could conceivably result in the loss of hundreds of thousands of
dollars of revenue yearly in this state, and would certainly precipitate a tortured reappraisal of the entire
excise tax structure by legislative and administrative
bodies involved in revenue administration in this state.
The preceding catalog of impending disasters admittedly may not in itself be convincing argument for defendant's position, but can it conceivably be maintained that
the Utah Legislature intended these things, which an
adoption of plaintiff's interpretation of 59-16-4( d) would
inevitably bring.J to come to pass~ We submit that it cannot, and thus plaintiff's interpretation of the statute
is erroneous.
It is presumed in the preceding paragraphs that this
use tax exemption, under an inverse application of the
Portland Cement holding that all sales tax exemptions
are also use tax exemptions, whether specifically stated
to be so or not, 110 Utah 156, 157, 176 P. 2d 881, is also
a sales tax exemption. The fact that there is no specific
sales tax exemption which would approximate in scope
and meaning 59-16-4( d) as interpreted by plaintiff, however, suggests in itself that this interpretation is erroneous, for there is no evidence that the legislature could
have intended to grant special and sweeping discriminatory concessions in the form of this type of exemption
in use tax transactions and not in sales tax transactions.
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And Subsection 59-16-4(d) predates by over a decade
the Union Portland Cement case.
The Court's attention is directed to the word "now"
in the statute. This indicates the point in time at which
the exemption may lie, and it must be that point in time
at which the use tax is first appropriate, at which the first
storage, use or consumption of the property in Utah takes
place. At that point in time in the instant case, there were
no ''gross receipts'' of any ''use'' of any property here
involved subject to an excise tax. Barrett's claim must
then fail, even if (and this is, of course, disputed) his
interpretation of other parts of the exemption provision
is correct.
POINT III.
THE PURCHASES HERE INVOLVED ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROl\1
UTAH USE TAX UNDER PROVISION OF
SECTION 59-16-4(h), U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff claims, in the alternative, exemption under
59-16-4(h), which exempts the following:
"Property which enters into and becomes an ingredient or component part of the property which
a person engaged in the business of manufacturing, compounding for sale, profit or use manufactures or compounds, or the container, label or the
shipping case thereof.''
Requirements for exemption under this statute are:
1. The claimant must be ''a person engaged in the

business of manufacturing or compounding for sale,
profit or use.''
14
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2. The property on which exemption is claimed
''enters into and becomes an ingredient or a component
part of the property'' manufactured.
It is the contention of the defendant that Barrett
Investment Company meets neither of these requirements. The pla.inliff provides a. service to the public,
and does not sell a product at all.
A statute identical or substantially identical to
59-16-4(h) is to be found in the following states, in addition to our own : Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming.
This exemption is thus not unique to our jurisdiction,
and the courts have often dealt with it. However, not one
case in any of these jurisdictions has ever sustained, or
ever seriously considered sustaining, the extension of the
exemption to services as plaintiff asks this Court to do
at this time. The cases dealing with this problem are collected in 30 A.L.R. 2d 1439.
A service and a product are generically different.
The word "product" in the exemption is usually interpreted as meaning only tangible personal property (in
most jurisdictions this exemption is not extended to
property which becomes permanently attached to real
estate as a fixture or component thereof). A service is
not tangible property, nor even intangible property, but
a different thing altogether.
Plaintiff places great reliance here, as in the previous
section, on the word "use," attempting to give it the
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same broad, sweeping definition given it in 59-16-4( d). It
is here inappropriate for exactly the same reasons it wa~
there inappropriate. There is no evidence that tlw legislature intended this word to have such a revolutionary
import and impact in either of these exemption subsections.
This exemption has been traditionally interpreted
particularly narrowly, as noted in the A. L. R. summary:
''In construing use tax provisions exempting from
the tax materials used in manufacturing, processing or compounding operations for the production
of tangible personal property, all materials becoming components or ingredients of personal
property resulting from such manufacturing, processing or compounding operations, courts have
frequently applied the general rule that tax exemption should be strictly construed against the
taxpayer." 30 A.L.R. 2d 1442.
See National Tube Co. v. Glander (1952), 157 Ohio
St. 407, 105 N.E. 2d 648, and Da.in. Mfg. Co. v. Iowa
Sta.te Tax Com1nission. (1946), 237 Iowa 531, 22
N.W. 2d 786.
CONCLUSION
The purchases previously described in Category (a)
are properly subject to Utah use tax, and the deficiency
assessment thereon should be sustained. Plaintiff has,
in fact, not argued against the tax on these purchases,
and thus there is no real controversy in relation thereto.
The deficiency assessment imposed upon the purchases in Category (b) should also be sustained. These
properties were used or consumed in Utah within the
16
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meaning of Title 59, Chapter 16, U.C.A. 1953, but (as
Barrett stipulates) there has been no sales or use tax
paid upon the purchase of these properties by plaintiff.
The purchase of these properties are not entitled to
exemption under provisions of 59-16-4(d). The interpretation of this section that plaintiff is urging upon the
Court is not consistent with the legislative intent behind
this provision, nor is it consistent with this Court's construction of the section in Union Portland Cement Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164, modified 110 Utah 176, 176 P. 2d 879.
Purchases here involved are also not entitled to exemption under provision of 59-16-4(h), U.C.A. 1953.
Neither this Court nor the court of any state with an identical or substantially identical exemption has ever given
approval to the extension of the statute plaintiff urg·es.
No other provision of Utah law entitles plaintiff
to exemption, and thus the claim to exemption must fail.
We, therefore, respectfully urge this Court to affirm the
decision of the State Tax Commission and uphold the
deficiency assessment in the amount of $1,548.11 (plus
interest) against plaintiff, Barrett Investment Company.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
M. REED HUNTER
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defen.darnt
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